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ARBITRATION AND AwAR--JuiiniroIRr ARBITRATORS-CONsTRUCTI N
OF SECoN TnREE OF NEW YORK ARBITRA.TION LAw.-The question was
submitted to three arbitrators "whether or not [the] 500 eases . . . of
butter . are a good delivery pcr terms of said contracts". The
contracts provided that an inspector's certificate as to quality should be
final. The defendant attempted to raise the question of quality at the
arbitration. Over the objection of the plaintiff that this was not within
the terms of the submission, the chairman of the arbitration board ruled
that the certificate of quality was not final; whereupon the plaintiff and one
arbitrator withdrew. The two remaining arbitrators took testimony and
made an award in favor of the defendant. The lower court vacated the
award, and the defendant appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed
under N. Y. C. P. A., 1924, see. 1453, and under the New York Arbitration
Law, see. 3. Bullard v. Grace (1925) 240 N. Y. 388, 148 N. E. 559.
The New York Arbitration Law provides that a party aggrieved by the
failure of another to perform a contract to arbitrate or to go through with
a submission once made, may petition the Supreme Court, and the Court,
upon being satisfied [1] "that the making of the contract or (2] submis-
sion or [3] the failure to comply therewith is not in issue", shall order the
arbitration to proceed "in accordance with the terms of the contract or
submission". Cahill's N. Y. Cons. Laws, 1923, ch. 2, see. 3. The court in
the instant case construed this section as reserving to a party to a sub-
mission the right to a judicial hearing on any of these three excepted
points before such party should be ordered to proceed with the arbitration.
To determine whether there has been a failure to comply with the terms
of the submission agreement, a court must obviously determine what ques-
tions have actually been submitted to the arbitrators. These questions, as
determined by the court, are the only ones that the arbitrators are author-
ized to decide. Boston Water Go. v. Gray (1843) 47 Mass. 131; In rec Eclky
(1925) 240 N. Y. 74, 147 N. E. 363. But where the court has not previously
interpreted the terms of the submission agreement, it becomes necessary
for the arbitrators themselves to do so, in order to determine what questions
have been submitted. Willesford v. Watson (1870) L. R. 8 Ch. App. 473; cf.
In re Kelley, supra. Decisions of law or fact made by the arbitrators are
not subject to judicial review unless an error appears on the face of the
award, i. e., unless the award is clearly 2furcasonablc. Hatch v. Cole (1024)
128 Wash. 107, 222 Pac. 463; Iu re Burke (1908) 191 N. Y. 437, 84 N. E.
405; Brodhead Co. v. Davis Co. (1924) 97 W. Va. 165, 124 S. E. 00. From
the standpoint of policy it would seem desirable that this rule should apply
also to the decision made by the arbitrators as to the scope of the submis-
sion; but the decisions appear to be generally in accord with the instant
case to the contrary. Halstead v. Scama (1880) 82 N. Y. 27; Adas-3 v.
Adams (1835) 8 N. H. 82; Picrcy v. Young (1879) 14 Ch. Div. 200. Yet
the possibility of a judicial hearing before as well as after the arbitration
clearly increases possible delays and ex-penses of litigation, whereas the
recognized purpose of the Arbitration Law was to diminish them. It seems
impossible to believe that the rights of the parties would be prejudiced if a
judicial hearing as to the scope of a submission could be had only after
arbitration.
BILLS AND NOTES-WANT OF CONSIDERATION-BURDEN oF Pnoop.-In a
suit by the plaintiff, as payee and holder of a promissory note made by the
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defendant, the latter alleged that the note was without consideration. The
jury was charged that under the Negotiable Instruments Law, sees. 24, 28,
(Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, ch. 225, secs. 4382, 4386) the burden of proving
lack of consideration was on the defendant. To this the defendant ex-
cepted. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant ap-
pealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Kessler v. Valerio (1925,
Conn.) 129 Atl. 788.
"Absence or failure of consideration is matter of defence as against any
person not a holder in due course. . . ." Negotiable Instruments Law,
sec. 28. To apply this section the court necessarily assumed that the payee
was not a holder in due course. It thus construed the section as a provision
regarding burden of proof. The jury having found for the plaintiff, how-
ever, it is evident that, for the purpose of this case, the payee was a holder
in due course, the other requisites being present. It seems, therefore, that
the court was in error in applying section 28 which is in point only as
against a holder not in due course. Had the court taken the position, ap-
parently not passed on in Connecticut, that a payee cannot be a holder in
due course, the foregoing would not apply. The better view, however,
would seem to be that a payee may become a holder in due course. Liberty
Trust Co. v. Tilton (1914) 217 Mass. 462, 105 N. E. 605; L R. A. 1915B,
144; Drumm Construction Co. v. Forbes (1922) 305 Ill. 303, 137 N. E. 225;
(1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 197, 710; contra: Vander Ploog v. Van Zzath
(1907) 135 Iowa, 350, 112 N. W. 807; (1908) 13 L. R. A. (N. S) 490. In
view of the difficulty of applying section 28 without first assuming the point
in issue, it seems probable that it should not be interpreted as assorting a
rule as to burden of proof. The section might reasonably be construed
as being merely a substantive declaration, See contra: Brannon, The
Negotiable Instruments Law (3d ed. 1920) 97; 1 Williston, Contracts
(1920) sec. 108. This construction is the more plausible since the probable
purpose of the latter part of the section was to resolve doubt as to whether
partial failure, whether liquidated or not, would constitute a partial de-
fence. Crawford, The Negotiable Instruments Law (3d ed. 1908) 43. It
seems doubtful that there is any controlling reason of policy for placing
the burden of proof on the defendant, it being a sufficient recognition of
the negotiable character of the instrument, in a suit between immediate
parties, that it be deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable con.
sideration. Sec. 24. The conflict existing on this point before the uniform
act has been continued. The construction adopted in the instant case has
considerable support. Piner v. Brittain (1914) 165 N. C. 401, 81 S. E. 462;
Shaffer v. Bond (1917) 129 Md. 648, 99 Atl. 973. But see contra on the
general question: Lombard v. Bryne (1907) 194 Mass. 236, 80 N. E. 489;
Ginn v. Dolan (1909) 81 Ohio, 121, 90 N. E, 141; (1925) 35 A. L. R. 1370,
note.
CARRIERS-EXTENT OF RECOVERY FOR PARTIAL Loss or INTERSTATE BAG-
GAGEL-The plaintiffs, interstate passengers, checked a trunk worth $675
without declaring its value. There was a partial loss of $111.30, and suit
was brought to recover this amount. Under tariffs filed with the interstate
Commerce Commission, payment for the tickets included transportation of
baggage not exceeding in value $200 for both passengers-this sum, in the
absence of a declaration of a greater value and payment of an additional
charge, to be binding upon the passengers as the value of the baggage
transported. Held, reversing the lower court, that the amount of recovery
for partial loss is limited to such a proportion of the carrier's maximum
responsibility ($200) as the actual loss ($111.30) bears to the actual value
($675) ; i. e., $32.98. Robidoux v. Chicago & N. W. By. (1925, Neb.) 204
N. W. 870.
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The effect of the decision in the instant ease is to mahe the plaintiff a
co-insurer for the excess above the agreed valuation. This is the scttlcd
rule in marine insurance. 2 Arnould, Marine Inurancc (11th cd. 1924)
1314. But it is believed that the rule there shows the influence of the law
of general average. Under valued policy statutes, the valuation placed on
property insured against fire, conclusive in case of a total 1os, is set aside
in assessing a partial loss, and serves merely as a limit of recovery.
Oppenheim v. Firenan's Fund Ins. Co. (1912) 119 Mlinn. 417, 108 N. W.
777; Sachs v. L. & L. Fire Ins. Co. (1902) 113 Ky. 88, G7 S. W. 23. In
the above cases the result was required by express statutory provisions, but
the same result has been reached in a recent case in seeming contradiction
to express words of the statute. Colunbia Real Estate and Trust Co. v.
Royal Ezchange Assvrance (1925, S. C.) 128 S. E. 865; see (1923) YUM
LAw JOURNAL, 376. Where a part only of a shipment of goods is lost, and
there has been an agreed valuation, some courts are in accord with the
instant case in allowing only a proportional recovery. Fielder v. Adam-
Express Co. (1911) 69 W. Va. 138, 71 S. E. 99; United States Express Co.
v. Joyce (1904, Ind.) 72 N. E. 865. Others treat the agreed valuation as
fixing merely a limit of recovery, and allow full recovery for a partial lozs
up to such limit. Tisanska v. Southen Express Co. (1912) 92 S. C. 573,
75 S. E. 962; Central of Georgia Ry. -. Broda (1914) 190 Ala. 20, 67
So. 437. Assuming, however, that the carrier's rates are based upon an
expectation that actual values will be declared, undervaluation considered
in reference to the totality of shipments handled by a carrier, will
obviously operate unjustly as to the carrier, since, unless the rule of
proportional recovery be applied, there will be a lessening of tariffs
allocable to premiums, without a proportionate lessening in payments to
be made on losses expected on such shipments. For the total expected
losses are made up of both total and partial losses, whereas under-
valuation under the non-proportional rule will result in a lessening of
payments on the total losses only, although in every ease undervaluation
will lessen the tariffs to be paid. On the other hand, it is believed that
the ordinary shipper understands such contracts as imposing responsibility
on the carrier in any event up to the sum fixed, and under the rule that
contracts limiting responsibility are to be construed strictly against the
carrier, it would seem that these expectations should be realized. Central
of Georgia Ry. v. Broda, supra. The court in the instant ease felt bound
by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Western Tran-it
Co. v. Leslie (1917) 242 U. S. 448, 37 Sup. Ct. 133. In that case the
agreed valuation was on a unit basis ("value not to exceed $100 per ton")
and something less than a ton (actually worth $271.38) had been lost. The
court held that "the valuation clause fixes not an arbitrary limit of recovery,
but a ratio"; but also that recovery should be "not more than $100 a ton
for each or any ton damaged or lost". (Italics ours). The language of the
decision is clearly ambiguous, and another decision by the Federal Supreme
Court will be needed to clarify the law on this point.
CONsTruTioNAL LAw-DuE PIRoCES--STATUTE INvALm ron AzoWYN;a
SuBSTITuTioN OF FOREIGN EXECUToR FOR DECuaSE D-rmuxT'.--In an ac-
tion i. personam, the defendant died pending suit, leaving no property in
New York. The plaintiff moved to substitute the decedent's foreign exe-
cutor, as authorized by the Decedent Estate Law, see. 160, amended by
N. Y. Laws, 1925, ch. 253. From judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff
appealed. Held, that the order be affirmed, because the statute as amended
violated the constitutional requirement of due procesz. Melellastcr v. Gould
(1925) 240 N. Y. 379, 143 N. E. 556.
In the final analysis "due process" appears to be no more than "reasonable-
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ness". COMMENTS (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 886. The statute in
question seems to fulfill this requirement, for one of the most important
functions of the probate courts is to settle all just claims against a decedent,
3 Schouler, Wills, Executors and Administrators (6th ed. 1923) sec. 1391.
And although the original conception of jurisdiction, as the authority of the
sovereign over territory in which the defendant is found, is still the stand-
ard test, there is to-day a growing acknowledgment that fair notice, when in
conjunction with the operative facts giving rise to a cause of action, is
the better test. COMMENTS (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 415. So it would
seem that a contrary and more desirable result could have been reached
in the instant case, unless the court is justified in its assumption that the
ancient rule that the decedent's representative has no legal existence in
another state because merely the statutory creature of the state of his
ajppointnent, can have no exception. But the very fact that the law of
wills, executors and administrators was created and is governed by statute,
should be sufficient reason to validate any reasonable changes in it which
the legislature might care to make. And the ancient rule actually has
many exceptions today. Thus an action in rem to foreclose a lien may be
maintained against a foreign executor. Holmes v. Camp (1916) 219 N. Y.
359, 114 N. E. 841. Where a legatee sued the executor and other legatees
to obtain a distribution of the estate, the foreign executor of a deceased
non-resident legatee, being a necessary party, was joined as defendant,
Stone v. Demarest (1902, 1st Dept.) 67 App. Div. 549, 73 N. Y. Supp. 903.
An administrator appointed in one state may be sued in another for a debt
owed by the intestate. Evans v. Tatem (1823, Pa.) 9 Serg. & R. 252; con-
tra: Fay v. Haven (1841, Mass.) 3 Mete. 109. [on ground that it was not
equitable to permit foreign representative to be sued when he could not
himself sue. But New York by statute permits him to sue. 3 Bliss, N. Y.
Annotated Code (6th ed. 1913) sec. 1836 (a)). Where jurisdiction was
obtained by service of summons within the state on a foreign executor who
died thereafter, the action was continued against the foreign administrator
with the will annexed, without further service. Thorburn v. Mitchell (1920,
1st Dept.) 193 App. Div. 174, 183 N. Y. Supp. 424. Moreover, in the in-
stant case, there would seem to be sufficient privity between the decedent
and his executor to constitute the entire matter but a single code cause of
action. Latine v. Clements (1847) 3 Ga. 426; see Clarke, The Code Cause
of Action (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 817. Under the instant decision,
due to the courts' clinging to the narrow, territorial notion of jurisdiction
which seems out of harmony with the ever increasing interstate activity
of to-day, the plaintiff is forced to the delay and expense of reinstituting
his action in another state.
DrvoRc--RECOGNITION oF FOREIGN DECREES IN NEW YoRn.-The defend-
ant left his wife, the plaintiff, in Canada, which was the matrimonial
domicile of the two, and obtained a divorce in Pennsylvania by substituted
service. He remarried and established his domicile in New York. The
plaintiff thereupon moved to New York and brought this action for divorce,
naming the second wife as co-respondent. From a judgment for the plaintiff,
the defendant appeals. Held, (two judges dissenting) that since the law of
Canada would not recognize the Pennsylvania decree, the judgment be
affirmed. Dean v. Dean (1925, 4th Dept.) 213 App. Div. 360, 210 N. Y.
Supp. 695.
Where a divorce decree is based on substituted service in a state other
than that of the domicile of the husband and wife or a state other than that
of the last matrimonial domicile, a court of another state is privileged to
question the validity of the decree. Haddock v. Haddock (1906) 201 U. S.
562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525; Ransom v. Ransom (1907, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 54 Misc.
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410, 104 N. Y. Supp. 193, aff'd (1903, 1st Dept.) 125 App. Div. 915, 103
N. Y. Supp. 1143. The stand taken in the more recent New York cases in
regard to decrees so awarded appears to be as follows: (1) Where the
matrimonial domicile of the parties to the foreign decree was New Yorl:,
the decree will not be recognized. Bell v. Little (1922, 4th Dept.) 204 App.
Div. 235, 197 N. Y. Supp. 674; O'Dea v. O'Dea (1835) 101 N. Y. 23, 4 N. U.
110. (2) Where the matrimonial domicile was not New York: (a) If
the defendant to the decree was a New York citizen at the time of the
suit for the decree, the decree will not be recognized. See Powcll v. Pozcll
(1925, 1st Dept.) 211 App. Div. 750, 756, 203 N. Y. Supp. 153, 15S;
Kaiser v. Kaiser (1920, 1st Dept.) 192 App. Div. 400, 402, 182 N. Y. Supp.
709, 711; of. Campbell v. Ca;zpbell (1S95, N. Y. Sup. CL Gen. T.) 90 Hun,
233; cf. contra: Hatch v. Hatch (1921, N. Y. Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 187 N. Y.
Supp. 568. (b) If the defendant to the decree was not a New York citizen
at the time of the suit and had not subsequently remarried, formerly the
decree would be recognized. Powell v. Powell, cvpra; cf. Pcreivral v. Pcr-
eival (1905, 2d Dept.) 106 App. Div. 111, 94 N. Y. Supp. 909, aff'd (1900)
186 N. Y. 587, 79 N. E. 1114; Hbbard v. Hubbard (1920) 228 N. Y. S1,
126 N. E. 508; contra: Matter of CaltabcUotta (1918, 4th Dept.) 133 App.
Div. 753, 171 N. Y. Supp. 82. But under such circumstances the instant
case applies the doctrine of rcnvoi,-i. c., the validity of the decree is
made to depend upon the effect which would be given it by the state in
which the defendant in the original suit v:as domiciled at the time of the
suit. See CommENT - .f LEw• Jounir,,, 191. (c) Where the
defendant to the decree, not a New York citizen at the time of the suit for
the decree, remarries: (i) If the second spouse was a New York citizen
at the time of the remarriage, formerly the decree would not he recognize .
Moe v. Moe (1874, N. Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T.) 2 Thomps. & C. 647; Bo;'dca v,.
Fitch (1818, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 15 Johns. 121. Today rcnvoi is applied. Ball
v. Cross (1921) 231 N. Y. 329, 132 N. E. 10G. (ii) If the second spouZe
was a New York citizen at the time of the suit for the decree, but not at
the time of the remarriage, qztacrc. Following the instant ease and Ball
v. Cross, supra, presumably revVoi would be applied. (iii) If the second
spouse was not a New York citizen at the time of the suit for the decree
or at the time of the remarriage, formerly the decree would be recognized.
See Ball v. Cross, svpra, at 331, 132 N. E. at 107; Powell V'. Powell, cupra,
at 756, 208 N. Y. Supp. at 158. But under the theory of the instant case
renvoi would be applied. The instant case, therefore, appears to effect a
simplification, substituting the following rules as to decrees the recognition
of which is not compulsory under the Constitution: 1. If, at the time of the
suit for the decree, (a) the defendant to the decree was a New York citi-
zen, or (b) New York was the matrimonal domicile, recognition will be
denied. 2. Otherwise reavoi will be applied. See, generally, NOTES (1923)
23 COL. L. REv. 469.
DomiciLI--DECnE OF UNFITNESS AS AFFECTING CHILD'S DoMIcILE AUWD
PARENT'S RIGHT TO CUSTODY.-A divorce decree on the ground of adultery
gave custody of an infant to the father and proclaimed the mother unfit
to have custody of it. The father died domiciled in Dutchess County.
Without notice to the mother, who was domiciled in New York County, the
surrogate of Dutchess County appointed a testamentary guardian for the
infant. On petition by the mother, it was held that the domicile of the
infant changed on the death of the father to that of the mother, and that
the appointment was, therefore, void for want of jurisdiction. The guar-
dian appealed. Held, (three judges dissr;,tbg) that the judm-eaint be
affirmed, since the decree of unfitness did not prevent the shift of the child's
373
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domicile to that of the mother. Matter of Thore (1925) 240 N. Y. 444,
148 N. E. 630.
Where no decree of unfitness accompanies the award of custody, the
domicile of the infant shifts at the death of the guardian-parent to the
domicile of the surviving parent. Clarke v. Lyon (1908) 82 Neb. 625, 118
N. W. 472; sed (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 447. The domicile of an
infant has, it seems, normally followed that of the person having the prima
facie right to the custody of the infant. Ex parte Means (1918) 176 N. C.
307, 97 S. E. 39; Ex parte McCoun (1915) 96 Kan. 314, 150 Pac. 516. If,
then, the decree of unfitness were operative to deprive the surviving parent
of this prima facie right upon death of the other spouse, it might be ex-
pected that the child's domicile would not shift in that event to the
domicile of the surviving parent. Cf. Bangor v. Veazie (1914) 111 Me.
371, 89 Atl. 193; In re Vance (1891) 92 Calif. 195, 28 Pac. 229 (loss of
custody of child through abandonment or emancipation involves loss of con-
trol over the child's domicile). But awards of custody relate only to the
circumstances of the time of the award. MaGill v. MaGill (1925) 133
Wash. 597, 234 Pac. 273; Schouler, Domestic Relations (6th ed. 1921) sec.
749. The effect of concurrent decrees of unfitness is generally limited in
like manner. The few American courts, therefore, which have passed on
the point recognize in the parent declared "unfit" a prima facie right to
custody of the child upon death of the other parent. In re Neff (1899) 20
Wash. 652, 56 Pac. 383 (parent decreed unfit because of non-support);
Bryan v. Lyon (1885) 104 Ind. 227, 3 N. E. 880 (parent decreed unfit
because of abandonment). English authority (under a statute) is contra.
Webley v. Webley (1891, Prob.) 64 L. T. R. 839; of. Handford v. Handford
(1890, Prob.) 63 L. T. R. 256 (parent decreed unfit because of murderous
assault on wife and children). Thus, in America, the decree of unfitness
seems to be no more than an expression of judicial opprobrium. It is
obvious, however, that the American cases have not involved serious deprav-
ity in the "unfit" parent. Whether the surviving parent's prima facie right
to custody in such a case would be recognized may still be regarded as an
open question, as may the related question of the locus of the infant's
domicile under those circumstances. Courts have not regarded adultery
as necessarily a disqualification for custody. Osterhoudt v. Oaterhoudt
(1900, 1st Dept.) 48 App. Div. 74, 62 N. Y. Supp. 529, aff'd (1901) 168
N. Y. 358, 61 N. E. 285; Brogna v. Brogna (1912) 67 Wash. 687, 122 Pac. 1;
see contra: Peese v. Gellerman (1908) 51 Tex. Civ. App. 39, 41, 110 S. W.
196, 197. The instant decision seems proper enough since there are, on
the facts, no compelling reasons for a decision one way rather than the
other. Cases may well arise, however, in which the determination of the
infant's domicile will be important in determining the disposition to be
made of a deceased infant's estate. As other considerations would be in-
volved in such a case, it seems clear that the instant case need not be
accepted as an authority predetermining the result therein.
EQUITY-MISTAKE--REFORiIATION TO PREVENT FUTURE: SuiT.-The plain-
tiff, alleging mistake, prayed for the reformation and specific enforqement
of a contract to sell land. Specific performance was denied because of the
Statute of Frauds. The plaintiff thereupon asked reformation as protec-
tion against a possible future action for breach of the contract as written.
Held, that the bill be dismissed, on the ground that, though the mistake
could be shown defensively in a future action, the plea was premature.
G'oss v. Yeskel (1925, N. J. Eq.) 130 Atl. 546.
Originally, the equitable defense had to be made use of by appealing to
the chancellor to enjoin the action at law. Hancock v. Blackwell (1897) 139
Mo. 440, 41 S. W. 205; contra: Non-Royalty Shoe Co. v. Phoenix Assur.
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Co. (1919) 277 Mo. 399, 210 S. W. 37 (because of a statute). But in suits
for specific performance parol evidence was admitted to prevent the Statute
of Frauds from being used inequitably. Marquis Tovnzshczd r. Stau groom
(1801, Ch.) 6 Ves. 328; Diffendeffer v. Knoche (1912) 113 Md. 189, 84 Atl.
416. Under some codes the defendant at law is permitted to set up his
equitable claim by a cross bill. South Portland Land Co. v. MAngcr (1893)
36 Or. 457, 54 Pac. 815, aff'd (1900) 36 Or. 457, 60 Pac. 5. And the fed-
eral equitable defense statute now allows the equitable defense to be set
up in the action at law. Jud. Code, see. 274b, Act of March 3, 1915, Ch. 90
(38 Stat at L. 956). In the instant case, since the defendant may ulti-
mately have to submit to the plaintiff's parol evidence, it would seem con-
venient and economical to have admitted it while the parties were before
the court. And in a closely analogous situation, equity does not withhold
relief until action is brought on the written contract. Thus relief has been
given against sealed instruments induced by fraud. Glanzill v. Jennings
(1669) Nels. Ch. 129; Lovell v. Hicks (1836, Exch.) 2 Y. & C. 46. In the
event the defendant in the instant case does not sue, the plaintiff is left
with a cloud on his title in the sense that while there is apparently a valid
contract to sell, although probably unenforceable as written, still this can-
not be established. Frequently when clouds upon title are removed, there
is no immediate threat of a suit. Kcsncr v. MBicch (1903) 204 Ill 320,
68 N. E. 405 (purported contract to sell land which agent had no authority
to sign); Day Land and Cattle Co. v. State (1887) G8 Tex. 520, 4 S. W.
865 (cancellation of invalid land certificates). It may be, however, that
in the instant ease no satisfactory evidence of mistahe was produced.
EQuITY RECEIERSHIP-RIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES TO PRIORITY OF PAY-
MENT OF TAXES IN ABSENCE OF STATUTE.-In an equity receivership suit
the United States filed its claim for taxes, claiming priority. This claim
was granted by the District Court. The other creditors appealed. Held,
that the order be affirmed. Liberty Mutual In2s. Co. v. Johnson Shipyard
Corp. (1925, C. C. A. 2d) 6 Fed. (2d) 752.
It has been held generally that the United States has no right to priority
of payment of debts, except by force of statute. United Statcs v. Ohlahowna
(1923) 261 U. S. 253, 43 Sup. Ct. 295; United States v. Fisher (1805, U. S.)
2 Cranch, 358. The court, in the instant case, although dealing with a
case involving taxes, thought it necessary to declare that a "fundamental
distinction" exists between taxes and debts, that "a debt is not a tax and
a tax is not a debt". Such a distinction, however, has not always been
recognized. Cf. Morrow v. Hayes (1924) 226 Mich. 301, 197 N. W. 554
(where the term "debt" was held to include "taxes" in a private contract
to indemnify for all "debts") ; Dollar Savings Bank v. Unitcd Statcs 11873,
U. S.) 19 Wall. 227 (where the United States recovered taxes in an action
for a debt). At least, the distinction was not necessary to the instant deci-
sion, since priority was finally granted on the ground that the United
States has "so much of the royal prerogative as belonged to the king in
his capacity of parezs patriae". The court relied solely on a dictum in
Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, supra, at 239, for there is ap-
parently no holding to this effect. Thus the government has been declared
as holding all the prerogatives of the king as parens patride, through the
enunciation of a "principle" broader than was necessary to the decision.
The concurring opinion seems sound in saying that "it is quite possible that
the implied prerogatives of a republic against its citizens may not go so
far", and sounder in saying that priority might better have been granted
merely because "the nature of a tax" gives it, "independently of statute."
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INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE-AMOUNT OF RECOVERY WHERE
PARTIAL DAMAGE ExcEEDs AMOUNT CARRIED.-A building of the actual
cost of $25,335 was damaged by fire to the extent of $12,047. The value
stated in the policy was $9000 and the amount of insurance was $7500. A
statute, after requiring the value of the property to be specified in the
policy, provided that in case of total loss, the insured should recover the
full amount of insurance and "a proportionate amount in case of partial
loss". The defense contended that this meant that the proportion between
the actual value ($25,335) and the actual damage ($12,047) should determine
the proportion between the insurance carried ($7,500) and the recovery,
making the latter $3,566. The lower court permitted recovery of the entire
amount of insurance carried, since the plaintiff's actual partial loss exceeded
it. Held (two judges dissenting) that the judgment be affirmed. Columbia
Real Estate & Trust Co. v. Royal Exchange Assurance (1925, S. C.) 128
S. E. 865.
Where the common law is not modified by statute the insured is entitled
to recover the actual loss sustained up to the full amount of the policy.
Getchell v. Mercantile & Manufacturer's Fire Ins. Co. (1912) 109 Me. 274,
83 Atl. 801; Eagle Ins. Go. v, Lafayette Ins. Co. (1857) 9 Ind. 443. Some
states have passed statutes expressly declaratory of this common law rule.
1 Ga. Code, 1911, sec. 2545; Ohio Gen. Code, 1921, sec. 9583. By eXpress
contract the insured may limit the ordinary measure of damages. Malin
v. Mercantile Town Mut. Ins. Co. (1904) 105 Mo. App. 625, 80 S. W. 56;
Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Sennett (1860) 37 Pa. 205; 4 Cooley, Briefs on
Insurance (1905) 3085. Obviously an express statute will curtail the in-
sured's recovery in the same way, and such statute must be considered a
part of the insurance contract. Barnett Bros. v. Western Assurance Co.
(1920) 143 Ark. 358, 220 S. W. 465; Alford v. New York Life Ins. Co.
(1919) 280 Mo. 11, 216 S. W. 754. But generally no statute is construed
to change a rule of the common law unless it does so by clear and un-,
hmbiguous language. In re Johnson's Will (1921) 175 Wis. 1, 183 N. W.
888; Baudfield v. Baudfield (1898) 117 Mich. 80, 75 N. W. 287; State v.
Sullivan (1909) 81 Ohio, 79, 90 S. E. 146. Moreover, where there is an
ambiguity, courts tend to interpret an insurance contract in favor of the
insured, since all its terms are proposed by the insurer. O'Brien v. North
River Ins. Co. (1914, C. C. A. 4th) 212 Fed. 102; Rochester v. Marl/land
Casualty Co. (1910) 143 Mo. App. 555, 128 S. W. 204. And where the
policy and a statute are to be construed together the insured still should
receive the benefit of any. doubt. Levinton v. Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co.
(1920) 267 Pa. 448, 110 At]. 295; Gazzam v. German Union Fire Ins. Co.
(1911) 155 N. C. 330, 71 S. E. 434; Vance, Insurance (1904) 430. But in
the instant case, although the result was desirable, it is submitted that it
was reached by doing considerable violence to the plain meaning of the
words of the statute.
INSURANCE-INSURA3LE INTEREST OF STOCKHOLDER IN SPECIFIC CORPORATE
Assnrs.-The plaintiff, sole stockholder in a corporation, insured its tim-
ber holdings with the defendants in his own name. The timber having
been destroyed by fire, the plaintiff sued on the policies. From a judgment
for the defendants, the plaintiff appealed. Held, that the judgment be
affirmed, on the ground that a stockholder has no insurable interest in
the corporate property. Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co. (1925, H. L.)
41 T. L. R. 447.
"Insurable interest" is not necessarily equivalent to unqualified owner-
ship, but may include "rights" in the res insured which are tenuous in the
extreme or altogether lacking. Fegan, Notes on the Development of the
Doctrine of Insurable Interest (1919) 8 GEORGETOWN L. JOUR. 1, 2. Thus,
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a surety may insure the property of the principal debtor appropriated to
the security of the creditor, although the surety's interest "in" the rcs is
merely a future power of subrogation conditional upon non-payment by
the debtor. Aerican Ins. Co. v. Dean (1922, Mo. App.) 243 S. W. 415;
see (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 444. And one who has contractcd to
move a house has been permitted to insure it to the amount of the expendi-
tures made under the contract and the profit expected thereunder. Pleat-
ers' & Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Thurston (1891) 93 Ala. 235, 9 So. 263. In
England a stockholder in a corporation has been permitted to insure his
"interest; in the adventure." Wilson v. James (1367) L. R. 2 E. 1:39.
This interest clearly consists of an interest in the corporate assets pro-
portional to his stock, plus a hope of profits. Whether profits as such
should be insurable may be considered doubtful. They are a mere ex-
pectancy whose insurance seems little less than a wager. There is ob-
viously no res the preservation of whose value is assured. In the case
of corporate assets, however, this latter objection dces not hold, and the
stockholder has many immediately enforceable rightF, of an equitable
nature with respect to such assets whether capital, surplus, or undivided
profits. See Coi:=nTs (1925) 34 YALE L.!w JOLmNmL, 057. In American
courts the stockholder has generally bsen permitte~l to insure his intercot
in specific corporatp property. W,'a?'Ls' v. Daz'enpsrt Fire Ins. Co. (1371)
31 Iowa, 464 (stock-in-trade of lumber company); Rigg, v. Comiacrce!
Mut. Ins. Co. (1890) 125 N. Y. 7, 25 N. E. 105S (steamers); Actiza Ii.
Co. v. Kennedy (1909) 161 Ala. 600, 50 So. 73 (printing outfit); Vance,
lnsrance! (1904) 117. The difficulty in evaluating the individual stockz-
holders' interest in specific corporate property, considered insurmountable
by the House of Lords in the instant case, is not really zerious, given
a financial statement (free from "water") and the value of the destroyei
property. Cf. Berle, Non-Cmdativc Preftrred Stoct: (1923) 23 COL. L.
Ruv. 358. But obviously on the facts of the instant case, this difficulty is
wholly imaginary.
LIENS-CONDITIONAL SALES--ORDER OF PrER.uNuc. BnT.mrc An1An 's
COSIMON LAW LIEN AND CLAm.i OF CoNmIoNAL VraDorP-The plaintiff,
assignee of a conditional sales contract, duly recorded, brought action for
conversion based on the refusal of the defendant artisan to relinquish an
automobile bailed to him for necessary repairs. The defendant pleaded a
common law lien and the plaintiff demurred. The demurrer was sustained,
and the defendant appealed. Held, that the judgment sustaining the de-
murrer be reversed, since authority to subject to liens for necessary repaira
was to be inferred from delivery with privilege of user. Ncto Britain Rca!
Estate and Title Co. v. Collington (1925, Conn.) 129 At. 780.
When the recording statutes have been complied with, the claim of a con-
ditional vendor is superior to all subsequently accruing claims unless the
vendee was authorized to subject the chattel to such claims. Small v.
Robinson (1879) 69 Me. 425; CommENTS (1923) 22 MicH. L. REv. 4G. So
an express negation of such authority will always defeat the subsequent
claim. Arnold v. Chandler Motors (1924) 45 R. I. 469, 123 At. 85. Au-
thority may be implied from some express term of the contract, as where
the vendee undertakes to keep the chattel in repair. Green v. All Motors,
Ltd. [1917] 1 K. B. 625; City National Bank: v. Laughln (1919, Te:. Cir.
App.) 210 S. W. 617. Or it may be implied, as in the instant case, as
necessarily incidental to the exercise of the privilege of user. Mcyera v.
Neeley & Ensor Auto Co. (1923) 143 Md. 107, 121 Atl. 910; Stcbbins v.
Balfour (1923) 157 Blinn. 135, 195 N. W. 773. This result seems partic-
ularly appropriate where the purchase price is to be paid, in whole or in
part, from earnings derived from the use of the chattel. Willar= v.
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Allsup (1861) 10 C. B. (N. s.) 417; Hammond v. Danielson (1879) 126
Mass. 294. Where the vendor knows repairs are being made and does not
object, he may be estopped to deny the authority. Broom & Son v. Dale
& Sons (1915) 109 Miss. 52, 67 So. 659; Etchen v. Dennis & Son Garage
(1919) 104 Kan. 241, 178 Pac. 408; contra: Baughman Auto Co. v.
Emanuel (1912) 137 Ga. 354, 73 S. E. 511. Some courts have refused to
imply the authority from mere delivery with privilege of user, lest the
vendor's security be impaired. Ehrlich v. Chapple (1924) 311 Ill. 467, 143
N. E. 61; Bath Motor Mart v. Miller (1922) 122 Me. 29, 118 Atl. 715;
(1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 623, 624. This reasoning has cogency where
a lienor has a power of sale. Such claims are generally postponed to the
claim of the vendor. Neitzel v. Lawrence (1924, Idaho) 231 Pac. 423
(statutory lienor); Liver v. Mills (1909) 155 Calif. 459, 101 Pac. 299 (in-
nocent purchaser) ; contra: Guaranty Security Corp. v. Brophy (1923) 243
Mass. 597, 137 N. E. 751. But common law liens give a privilege of re-
tention only until receipt of reasonable compensation for the repairs. See
Meyers v. Neeley & Ensor Auto Co., supra, at 109, 121 Atl. at 917. The
value of the repairs obviously accrues to the vendor and it seems equitable
that payment should be a condition precedent to this privilege of retaking
the chattel. The inconvenience of record-searching may justify an excop-
tion in favor of repairmen. In the instant case, the authority might have
been inferred from express contract stipulations, but the court soundly
elected the broader ground of authority based on privilege of user.
MARRIAGE AND DIVoRcE--DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN ADULTERY
CHARGE AS GROUND FOR DIVORCE.-A petition for divorce was based upon a
charge of adultery by the wife. The vice-chancellor below dismissed the
suit on the ground that the petitioner had failed to support his case by a
preponderance of the evidence. The petitioner appealed. Held, (four
judges dissenting) that the judgment be affirmed, since the fact of adultery
must be established not merely by a preponderance of the evidence, but by
evidence such as to leave the court free from "conscientious and perplexing
doubts". Marchese v. Marchese (1925, N. J. Eq.) 129 Atl 131.
The rule requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt where a criminal
act is charged in a civil case has been generally repudiated. Blackmore V.
Ellis (1904) 70 N. J. L. 264, 57 Atl. 1047 (assault and battery); Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. Southern Surety Co. (1920) 285 Mo. 621, 226 S. W.
926 (larceny); Cooper v. Spring Valley Water Co. (1911) 16 Calif. App.
17, 116 Pac. 298 (theft); contra: Meinturff v. Insurance Co. of North
America (1910) 248 Ill. 92, 93 N. E. 369 (arson). But in some civil cases,
something more than a preponderance of the evidence is required. 5 Wig-
more, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 2498 (collecting the cases). The ex-
planation of these stricter requirements seems uncertain, but it has been
suggested that they are a survival from the old chancery practice. Ellett
v. Ellett (1911) 157 N. C. 161, 72 S. E. 861. In divorce cases, based upon
a charge of adultery, some courts are in accord with the instant case in
requiring a higher standard of proof than is ordinarily required in civil
cases. Sterling v. Sterling (1924, Md.) 125 Atl. 809 ("clear and con-
vincing"); Vickers v. Vickers (1921) 89 W. Va. 236, 109 S. E. 234 ("so
strong and clea~r as to carry conviction of the truth of the charge") ; Berok-
mans v. Berckmans (1864) 17 N. J. Eq. 453 ("beyond a reasonable doubt",
defined as meaning "free from conscientious and perplexing doubts"). But
the majority do not depart from the usual rule in civil cases. Jenkins v,
Jenkins (1922, Or.) 204 Pac. 165; Neff v. Neff (1921) 96 Conn. 273, 114
Atl. 126; Lindley v. Lindley (1896) 68 Vt. 421, 35 At. 349. The desirabil-
ity of the departure in the instant case from the usual rule seems question-
able. The historical explanation of the rule requiring proof "beyond a
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reasonable doubt" in criminal cases was the barbarity of the penal code.
May, Some Rules of Evidence (1876) 10 Am. L. REv. 642. There are,
of course, no such considerations in modern civil cases. Wigmore, op. cit.
sec. 2498. It has been urged in justification of the rule of the instant ease
that the stigma of "adulteress" should not lightly be put upon a defendant.
See Berckmans v. Berckmans, supra, at 460. But this is not necessarily
conclusive, since in New Jersey it is settled that a preponderance of the
evidence is sufficient to sustain, in a civil case, a charge of arson with in-
tent to defraud insurers. Kane v. Hibernia Ins. Co. (1877) 39 N. J. L.
697. And the judgment of society as expressed in statutes is that as be-
tween adultery and arson, arson is the more heinous offense. Cf. Comp.
St. N. J. 1910, 1760, 1786.
PERSONAL PrOPERTY-GIFTS CAUs& MloRns ILDE IN CONT' MPI.TIONT OP
Suicm.--Before committing suicide, the donor delivered to her brother
envelopes containing money, which were addressed to donees. The admin-
istrator of the donor issued this summons to test the validity of these gifts.
Held, that these were not valid gifts causa vnzortis, since if the donor was
insane at the time of death she had no capacity to complete the gifts; if
she was sane, she could not give effect to the gifts by a crime. Dnwdian v.
Dudman (1925, Ch.) 133 L. T. R. 465.
Formerly, the personalty of a suicide was forfeited to the crown. 4
Blackstone, Conmentaries, *190. Wills of suicides were, therefore, inoper-
ative to pass personalty. Matter of Bailey (1861, Prob. Ct.) 2 Sw. & Tr.
156. Forfeiture has, however, been abolished by statute. (1870) 3 & 24
Vict. ch. 23, sec. 1. And wills of suicides bequeathing personalty are now
given effect. 1 Jarman, Wills (6th ed. 1910) 61. This has always been
the American rule. Koegel v. Egn4r (1896) 54 N. J. Eq. 623, 35 Atl. 394;
Roche v. Nason (1906) 185 N. Y. 128, 77 N. E. 1007. In view of the aboli-
tion of this policy of forfeiture, however, the decision in the instant case
must be justified, if at all, on other grounds. The theory, implied in the
instant case, that the property in a gift ca.sa mortis passes only upon the
death of the donor, seems to be contrary to the prevailing view that where
the donor has attempted to retain the property until death the transaction
is invalid as an attempted testamentary disposition. McCord v. MeCord
(1882) 77 Mo. 166; Basket v. Hassell (1882) 107 U. S. 602, 2 Sup. Ct 415;
Reddel v. Dobree (1839, Ch.) 10 Sim. 244; Farqtharson, v. Cave (184G, Ch.)
2 Coll. 356; Mitchell v. Smith (1864, Ch.) 4 De G. J. & S. 421. The better
view seems to be that the property passes at once with the condition that it
shall revert to the donor upon revocation by him, or upon his surviving the
contemplated peril. Basket v. Hassell, sitpra; Emery V. Clough (1885) 03
N. H. 552; ef. Hewitt v. Kaye (1868) L. R. 6 Eq. 198; Moorc r. Moore
(1873) L. R. 18 Eq. 474, 485; contra: Hatchcr v. Bzuford (1895) 60 ArIz.
169, 29 S. W. 641; see Bz,.mn v. Markham (1816, C. P.) 7 Taunt. 224, 229.
In one aspect a gift cause mortks is an extraordinary power, functionally
similar to the power of bequeathal, granted, in exception to the policy of
the Statute of Wills, to persons in imminent peril of death. It stands on
somewhat the same footing as the power of making nuncupative wills. On
the other hand, it is often merely a juridical device to do justice to the
donor in view of the fact that the expectation of death is the prepotent
inducement to the making of what is intended at the time to be an abzoluto
gift inter vivos. Cf. Grymes v. Hone (1872) 49 N. Y. 17, 21; Gardncr .
Parker (1818, Ch.) 3 Madd. 184, 185; Moore v. Moore, aupra. Clearly one
contemplating suicide is in no such imminent peril as to justify an exception
to the general policy of the Statute of Wills. But it is believed that the
facts of the instant case show no actual attempt to make a gift caus inckr~i.
Rather they show an attempt to make a gift inter v'ivos. As such a gift is
380 YALE LAW JOURNAL
impeachable as a constructive gift causa mortis only at the suit of the donor
who has survjved the contemplated peril, it would seem that after the
donor's death the gift should be open to attack by the administrator only on
the grounds of imperfect delivery or of mental incapacity at that time to
make the gift. The making of a gift should require no greater mental
capacity than the making of a will. This has been recognized by the deci-
sions in this country. Sass v. McCormaek (1895) 62 Minn. 234, 64 N. W.
385; Matter of Hall (1896, Surro. Ct.) 16 Misc. 174, 38 N. Y. Supp. 1135.
Both in this country and in England it has been held that contemplation of
suicide is not conclusive of testamentary incapacity. McElwee v. Ferguson
(1875) 43 Md. 479; Burrows v. Burrows (1827) 1 Hagg. Eccl. 109; Matter
of Bailey, supra. (This last case did not turn on testamentary capacity.
The court intimated that the will would have been effective to pass realty).
It would seem, therefore, that on the facts, the gifts should have been held
valid as inter ivivos.
PLEADING-ANSWER INSUFFICIENT AS A CONCLUSION OF LA.-The plain-
tiff sued on a promissory note. The defendant answered, "not indebted to
the plaintiff upon the note sued on." The court sustained the plaintiff's
motion for a judgment on the pleadings, on the ground that the defendant's
answer was neither a general nor a special denial. Held, on appeal, that
the judgment be affirmed. Franklin Bank v. International Hospital Equip-
ment Co. (1925, Mo.) 273 S. W. 197.
Most cases agree with the instant case that an allegation or denial of
indebtedness is insufficient, such statements usually being considered mere
"conclusions of law". Fox v. Monahan (1908) 8 Calif. App. 707, 97 Pac.
765; Clements v. Cooper (1912, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 136 N. Y. Supp. 93;
contra: Gillespie Bros. v. Page (1910) 87 S. C. 82, 68 S. E. 1044. But the
distinction between a "statement of fact" and a "conclusion of law" seems
to be one of degree only, for when a statement of certain happenings is
sufficiently abbreviated into a general classification it is called a "conclusion
of law", while, if less general, it is called a "statement of fact". Payno
v. Treadwell (1860) 16 Calif. 220; see Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading
under the Codes (1921) 21 CoL. L. Rnv. 416, 423; Clark, The Complaint in
Code Pleading (1925) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 259; see State v. Green
(1913) 87 Vt. 94, 97, 88 At. 515, 517. But, although words state certain
happenings in abbreviated form, and a certain knowlege of law is necessary
thus to classify and combine them, they are none the less statements of
facts. Cook, op. cit. 420; see Eaglefidld v. Marquis of Londonderry (1876)
4 L. R. Ch. Div. 693, 702; Clark v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. (1881) 81
Minn. 69, 71. Failure to recognize this has resulted in endless confusion.
Thus, in the following cases, words have been held "conclusions of law":
Fulton v. Varney (1907, 1st Dept.) 117 App. Div. 572, 102 N. Y. Supp. 608
("valuable consideration"); Tallasse Falls M'fg Co. v. Moore (1908) 158
Ala. 356, 48 So. 593 ("that the plaintiff assumed the risk"); Florence Land
Co. v. City of Florence (1915) 193 Ala. 179, 69 So. 109 ("that ground is a
public park"); Fox v. Monahan, supra, ("indebted"); Pacetti v. Central
of Georgia Ry. (1909) 6 Ga. App. 97, 64 S. E. 302 ("that plaintiff knew or
ought to have known"). But in the following cases, similar phrases have
been considered "statements of fact": California Packing Co. v. Kelley
Storage Co. (1920) 228 N. Y. 49, 126 N. E. 269 ("a valuable considera-
tion"); Gillespie Bros. v. Page, supra ("indebtedness"); Do Runtz v. St.
Louis Police Relief Assoc. (1913) 180 Mo. App. 1, 168 S. W. 1053 ("thit
he had complied with laws, rules and regulations");: Atlantic Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Cheshire (1913) 12 Ga. App. 652, 78 S. E. 53 ("that defendant knew
or should have known"). Under what seems the better theory of pleading
this attempted distinction between "statements of fact" and "conclusions of
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law" is avoided by substituting the test of whether the words give reason-
able notice of the pleader's case. Clark, Histoiy, Systcnz, and Functiona
of Pleading (1925) 11 VA. L. REv. 517; Cook, op. cit.; Whittier, Notice
Pleading (1918) 31 HARY. L. Ray. 501; see American Exprcss Co. V. State
(1918) 132 Md. 72, 74, 103 Atl. 96. In the instant case, even though suf-
ficient notice may not have been given, the plaintiff, if in honest doubt as
to his opponent's defense, should have been granted a bill of particulars
rather than a judgment on the pleadings. Whittier, op. cit. 521; Aizcrcan
Plate Glass Co. v. Struthers-Wells Co. (1912, C. C. A. 3d) 201 Fed. 6; see
Wall v. Buffalo Water Co. (1885) 18 N. Y. 119, 122. Thus pleading, in-
stead of being an end in itself, which is not desirable, would be an aid in
the application of substantive law. See COM ENTS (1925) 35 YAns LAW
JOURNAL, 85, 89; see Dunnett z,. Thornton (1900) 73 Conn. 1, 5, 46 Ati. 158,
160; Pound, Procedural Reform (1910) 4 ILL. L. REV. 388, 402.
PuBLic LANDs-VALmiTY OF MORTGAGE ON HoaxEsT&%D ENTER.-The
plaintiff executed to the defendant two mortgages on his federal home-
stead entry before having made final proof or received the official patent.
Later, when he became owner in fee by award of the patent, he sued to
quiet title and cancel the mortgages. Judgment was rendered for the
plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed, on the ground
that the federal statute, exempting the homestead entry from liability for
debts contracted prior to patent date, did not apply to voluntary mortgages.
Bashore v. Adolf (1925, Idaho) 238 Pac. 534.
It is provided by statute that until issue of the patent, the legal title to
the entry remains in the government. U. S. Rev. Sts. 1874, see. 2291.
The entryman may not alienate his interest before he acquires title. U. S.
Rev. Sts., loe. cit. Either by deed. Hale v. McGraw (1917) 201 Ala. 353,
78 So. 214. Or by contract to convey when patent is issued. Andcrson. v.
Carkins (1890) 135 U. S. 483, 10 Sup. Ct. 905. Nor may the land become
liable to satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the patent date. U.
S. Rev. Sts. 1874, sec. 2296; Ruddy v. Rossi (1018) 248 U. S. 104, 39 Sup.
Ct. 46; NoTns (1919) 32 HARV. L. REv. 721. These limitations are to pre-
vent fraud on the government and to encourage the development of the
public domain. See Anderson v. Carkins, supi-a, at 489, 10 Sup. Ct. at
907; Ruddy -v. Rossi, supra, at 107, 39 Sup. Ct. at 47. Where no conflict
with the purposes of the statutes arises, courts, even before award of
the patent, grant the entryman many incidents of ownership. Thus from
date of original entry, the entryman may be taxed as owner of the land.
Witherspoon -v. Duncan (1866, U. S.) 4 Wall. 210. He may assert his in-
terest to defeat the claim of a holder of a subsequent government grant of
the entire district. Hastings & D. Ry. v'. Whitncy (1889) 132 U. S. 357,
10 Sup. Ct. 112. He may also maintain an action of ejectnent. Thomp-
sou v. Basler (1906) 148 Calif. 646, 84 Pac. 161. Finally, when he fulfills
the conditions precedent to his right to the patent, the government is said
to hold the title in trust for him. See United States it. Detroit Company
(1906) 200 U. S. 321, 337, 26 Sup. Ct. 282, 287. Where, as in the instant
case, a mortgage is given on the land before the patent is issued, it is
generally allowed. Adam v. McClintock (1911) 21 N. D. 483, 131 N. W.
394; see also Hafenzan v. Gross (1905) 199 U. S. 342, 347, 26 Sup. Ct. 80,
83. They are held to be neither "alienations". Lohman, State Bank v.
Grim (1924) 69 Mont. 444, 222 Pac. 1052. Nor violations of Sec. 2296.
Klempp v. Northrop (1902) 137 Calif. 414, 70 Pac. 284. But they are
called equitable mortgages. Adam v. McClintock, supra. Hence, the sub.
sequently acquired title is held to inure to the mortgagee's benefit. Wild-
7nan v. Means (1922) 208 Ala. 487, 94 So. 823. The courts base the validity
of these mortgages on the fact that they are voluntary. First State BEan:
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v. Durand (1923) 69 Mont. 184, 222 Pac. 434. But the underlying reason
seems to be that they do not militate against the purpose of the statutory
restraints, especially since it seems that the mortgagee acquires no en-
forceable rights until the mortgagor personally acquires the patent. Mar-
tyn v. Olson (1914) 28 N. D. 317, 148 N. W. 834; Hebert v. Brown (1895,
C. C. A. 5th) 65 Fed. 2. But if mortgages are thus upheld, courts seem
inconsistent in following Anderson v. Carkins, supra, to the effect that
contracts to convey after the patent is issued are void.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-INTOXICATING LIQUoR-QUASHING OF WARRANT
BASED ON INFORMATION OBTAINED BY TRESPASS.-A federal prohibition
agent, without permission, entered the yard and buildings of the defendant
and there discovered alcohol illegally possessed. This was afterwards
seized under a search warrant based on the information thus obtained.
The defendant moved that the warrant be quashed and the property re-
turned. Held, that the motion be denied. United States v. Bloom (1925,
D. C. Mass.) 6 Fed. (2d) 584.
The federal courts and some state courts refuse to admit evidence ob-
tained without a warrant, or with an invalid warrant. United States v.
Madden (1924, D. C. Mass.) 297 Fed. 679; State v. Harris (1923, Mo.)
250 S. W. 925; contra: People v. Bowen (1923, Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co.) 120
Misc. 342, 198 N. Y. Supp. 306; (1922) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 285, 745;
COMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 518. Likewise, warrants
have been quashed and seized property returned where the warrants
were based on information obtained in an illegal manner. Thus where
prohibition agents under warrant for search of another building forcibly
searched the defendant's residence and found liquor it was held that this
information could not be the basis for another warrant. United States v.
Boasberg (1922, E. D. La.) 283 Fed. 305; ef. Kirvin v. United States (1924,
C. C. A. 2d) 5 Fed. (2d) 282. And in at least one instance the court or-
dered the return of documents obtained by a search warrant, issued on
information obtained by a previous forcible search. United States v. Kraus
(1921, S. D. N. Y.) 270 Fed. 579; cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States (1919) 251 U. S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct. 182. Similarly, where a search
warrant was issued on knowledge obtained by a prior breaking and enter-
ing, it was held that the evidence obtained under this warrant should
be returned. People v. Alverson (1924) 226 Mich. 342, 197 N. W. 538;
Blakemore, Prohibition (2d ed. 1925) 408; ef. State v. Gibbons (1922)
118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390. But where the search warrant was based on
observations by prohibition agents while on the premises by implied license,
it was held that its issuance was valid. Nicholson v. United States (1925,
C. C. A. 7th) 6 Fed. (2d) 569; People v. Flaczinski (1923) 223 Mich. 650,
194 N. W. 566. The entry in the principal case was, without doubt, a
technical trespass. 2 Jaggard, Torts (1895) 660. But in all of the cases
to which the federal rule has thus far been extended, as exemplified above,
so as to result in a quashing of the warrant, there has been in addition
some element of force or fraud, which has been made the basis of the ex-
tension. The presence of force or fraud may well be the proper criterion
for deciding these cases.
SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY-ALTERATION BY FILLING IN BLANS.c-A con-
tract guaranteed payment of past indebtedness in one clause, and in another
left blank a space provided for stipulating the amount. The jury found
that the blank had been filled in by the plaintiff after the signing by the
defendants as compensated sureties. The plaintiff company sued for the
amount as to the correctness of which there was no dispute and the defend.
ants claimed a discharge on the ground of material alteration. Held, (three
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judges dissenting) that the plaintiff have the judgment, since the alteration
was immaterial Watkins Co. v. Deubcigh (1925, Wash.) 238 Pac. 13.
Any change in a suretyship contract is said to be "material" that causes
the instrument to speak language that is different in legal effect; but as
a practical matter it is often difficult to determine what is a "material"
change. Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) sec. 565. This is exemplified
by a group of cases, of which the instant case is one, where the Watins
Company, the plaintiff in the principal case, sued on what appeared to be
indentical form contracts, altered as in the instant case, in which the
courts differed sharply as to the "materiality" of the alteration. In some of
these cases the reduction of the obligation to a liquidated sum, such as the
alteration in the instant case effects, was held to be "material".
Watkins Co. v. Fornea (1924) 135 Miss. 690, 100 So. 185; Watkins Co. v.
Keeney (1925, N. D.) 201 N. W. 833; Watkins Co. v. Miilcr (1913) 40 S.
D. 505, 168 N. W. 373; contra: Watkins Co. 2. Powell (1923) 93 O1ia.
219, 220 Pac. 585; Dr. Ward's Mcdical Co. v. Wolicat (1924) 160 Minn.
21, 199 N. W. 738 (contract same as in Watldns Company cases); see
Heard v. Tappan (1903) 116 Ga. 930, 935, 43 S. E. 375, 378. In all but
the Miller case, supra, the "materiality" was found in the enhanced eviden-
tial value of the instrument. Cf. Low v. Argrorc (18CO) 30 Ga. 129. The
court in the instant case, while recognizing the change in evidentiary effect,
held that there was no change in "legal effect" and therefore no "material"
alteration-probably because the substantive relations of the parties would
be unchanged, even if the instrument were given effect as altered. But it
seems unreasonable to say that a change in evidential effect is "immaterial",
in the accepted sense, although, in the instant case, the change was cer-
tainly not injurious to the defendant, and the result reached is undoubtedly
sound. Some courts have reached the same result as the court in the
instant case by implying an authority to fill in correct amounts. McConnon,
& Co. v. Hovland (1923) 156 Minn. 222, 194 N. W. 394. But that method
of handling these cases seems objectionable, since the authority is clearly
a fiction. It would seem, as has before been recognized, that the proper
test is not change in legal effect but harm to the surety, even where he is
an uncompensated surety as in the instant case. Cf. Camnbrdge Savings
Bank v. Hyde (1881) 131 Mass. 77.
SURoTYSHIP AND GUARANTY-EFFECT OF SUnmr's SIGNMTURE A=Ta Ex%-
CUTION OF A RENEWAL NOTE BY THE PRINCIPAL DEBTolm-The plaintiff ac-
cepted promissory notes signed by the defendant's stepson as maker, and
by the defendant as surety. At maturity the stepson signed a renewal
note which he left with the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereupon sent it to the
defendant for her signature. The defendant signed and returned the in-
strument to the plaintiff. In a suit on this renewal note judgment was
rendered for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. Held, that judg-
ment be affirmed on the ground that no consideration was given for the
defendant's signature. State Bank of Peel: v. Pickens (1925, Kan.) 237
Pac. 651.
Adherence to the legalistic requirement of a present detriment to the
promisee or a present benefit to the promisor makes for the general rule
that new consideration is necessary to support the signature of the surety,
made after execution of the note by the principal. 1 Brandt, Law of
Suretyship and Guaranty (3d ed. 1905) see. 26. Such subsequent promise
by the surety is enforceable, however, if it -was contemplated by principal
and maker when the note was executed. Kuglc -a. Tradcro Banl (1923,
Tex. Civ. App.) 252 S. W. 208; Deposit Ban ] v. Pcal (1901) 110 Ky. 579,
62 S. W. 268; but cf. Sawyer v. Fernald (1871) 59 Me. 500. The result is
then rationalized by saying that the transaction is not really closed until
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the surety signs. Deposit Bankc ". Peak, supra; Kissire v. Plunkett-Jarroll
Co. (1912) 103 Ark. 473, 145 S. W. 567. Or, by saying that the surety's
act is, "in the eyes of the law", contemporaneous with the principal's. Ailcs
v. Miller (1913) 52 Ind. App. 280, 100 N. E. 475, A sound reason for hold-
ing the surety in these cases, apart from any attempt at legalistic rational-
ization, seems to be that the creditor is induced to accept the note by the
expectation that the surety will sign. Steers v. Holmes (1890) 79 Mich.
430, 44 N. W. 922. And the surety signs with the intention of continuing
the existing relationship. The present decision undoubtedly defeated the
reasonable expectations of all 'parties to the transaction. It re~imphasizes
the need of a broader and less technical concept of consideration-one
more in accord with the common sense of the business community. Holmes,
Collected Legdl Papers (1920) 191-192.
1
TAXATIoN-INcomE TAX-BUSINESS TRuST TAXABLE AS CORPORATION, NOT
AS PARTNERSHIP.-The Burk-Waggoner Oil Association is a "business trust"
formed in Texas under a trust instrument which provided for transferable
shares. It was assessed as a corporation under the Revenue Act of 1918,
for income and excess profits taxes. It paid the taxes under protest and
brought suit for their recovery, contending that since, by the common law
of Texas, the Association was a partnership, taxation of it as a corporation
was unwarranted. Held, that the tax is valid. Burk-Waggoner Oil Asso-
ciation v. Hopkins, Collector (Nov. 1925, U. S.) Adv. sheets, No. 67.
The Revenue Act, Section 1, defines the term "corporation" as including
"associations" and "joint stock companies". It subjects corporations to
taxes different from those imposed upon individuals carrying on business in
partnership. The sections referring to partnerships denote, the court holds,
ordinary partnerships, not business trusts which resemble in form and
effectiveness corporate organizations. Such a construction of the Act was
clearly foreshadowed in a previous case involving excess profits taxes.
Hecht v. Malley (1924) 265 U. S. 144, 44 Sup. Ct. 462. The contention that
the Act, thus construed, is unconstitutional, is disposed of summarily by
the declaration that "nothing in the Constitution precludes Congress from
taxing as a corporation an association which, although unincorporated,
transacts its business as if it were incorporated". Whether individuals do
business as a corporation, as an unincorporated association, or as an ordi-
nary partnership, it is in reality the individual members of the group who
are engaged in the business, and it is upon them that legal relations are
imposed, by common law or statute, as a consequence of their business
activities. Their legal relations may vary with the form of their business
organization: there may be only a liability to have the "corporate" fund
taken to pay debts incurred in the business, or there may be a duty to pay
out of any property they own. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Concep-
tions and Other Legal Essays (1923) 194 et seq. When they conduct their
business in the form called a "business trust", the duty to pay debts in-
curred in connection with the enterprise may rest upon the individual
",shareholders" to the same extent as if they were doing business as ordinary
partners. It is customary then to call them a partnership. MeCamey v.
Hollister Oil Co. (1922, Tex. Civ. App.) 241 S. W. 689; see (1922) 32 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 83. But the label "partnership" should not be thought a
universal formula for determining their legal relations in other situations.
In respect of many of these relations the business trust is like the corpora-
tion rather than the partnership. No reason is apparent why the statutory
liability of the associates to have part of their income taken as income
taxes should not be made similar to the liability imposed on persons doing
business in the corporate form rather than similar to the duty to pay in-
come taxes imposed on ordinary partners. Cf. Morgan '. 'Deputy Federal
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Commwissioner (1912, Australia) 15 Commonw. L. R. 61 (statute taxing
shareholders of corporation as though they were joint owners of corporate
land not unconstitutional); R. L Hospital Tr.st Co. v. Doughton (1924)
187 N. C. 263, 121 S. E. 741 (valid inheritance tax on non-resident share-
holders of foreign corporation owning property in taxing state); contra:
Shepard v. State (1924) 184 Wis. 88, 197 N. W. 344.
TORTS-PERSONAL INJURY-DAMAGES roR DISFIGUREENT.-The plaintiff
was injured by the defendant, permanent facial disfigurement resulting.
From a judgment including damages for the disfigurement, the defendant
appealed. Held, that the judgment be reversed. Colonial Coal & Cohe Co.
v. Hobson (1925, Ky.) 271 S. W. 680.
Most courts that deny recovery for disfigurement put their refusal on
the ground that the disfigurement is "inseparable" from the resulting
mental anguish for which there can be no recovery. Camnzind v. Free-
land Furniture Co. (1918) 89 Or. 158, 174 Pac. 139; Bonclli v. Brandckrc
(1922) 127 Mliss. 556, 90 So. 245; cf. Hcndricks v. Jones (1922) 23 Ga. App.
335, 111 S. E. 81. The rule denying recovery for mental anguish is, how-
ever, ordinarily limited to those cases wherein the mental anguish has
arisen independently of a proved physical injury; and the rule is explained
on the ground that mental anguish, being only a state of mind, is difficult
to prove, and, if proved, is difficult to translate into money damages.
Camenzind v. Freeland Furniture Co., supra; Sonthern Pacific Co. v. Hetzcr
(1905, C. C. A. 8th) 135 Fed. 272. These considerations are not operative,
however, to preclude recovery in other fields of the law, as, for example,
in defamation. There the impossibility of any exact monetary equivalent
for the harm to the plaintiff does not bar recovery. Conard v. Dillingtam
(1922) 23 Ariz. 596, 206 Pac. 166. And exemplary damages are made to
depend on proof of actual malice although that, also, is only a state of
mind. Mattice v. Wilcox (1895) 147 N. Y. 624, 42 N. E. 270. The real
objection to recovery for mental anguish seems, however, to be fear of
fraud based on difficulty of proof, for most courts permit recovery therefor
when the fact of mental anguish is reasonably inferable from other facts
more easily proved-for example, physical injuries. Salun v. Trosper
(1882) 27 Kan. 544. It would seem that a disfigurement, being patent to
observation, is such a fact; and mental anguish is almost inevitably to be
inferred from a disfigurement. Indeed, a disfigurement would seem itself
to be a physical injury. Coombs v. King (1910) 107 Me. 376, 78 At]. 463;
Shortridge v. Scarritt Estate Co. (1910) 145 Mo. App. 295, 130 S. W. 120.
The court in the instant case affirmed the general rule allowing recovery
for "mental suffering caused by the injury"; yet it denied recovery. The
court may have rationalized this apparent inconsistency by a narrow view
of what constitutes an "injury". Some courts seem to regard the "injury"
as ceasing with actual physical pain. Cf. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Hine3
(1892) 45 Ill. App. 299. But even if the concept "injury" be still more
narrowly limited-to the actual physical impact-it is difficult to regard
the disfigurement and the mental anguish therefrom resulting as other than
the direct and probable consequence of the "injury".
WATERS AND WATERCOURSEs-PURCHASER or LAND ON AIrtIFiCIAL PoD
ACQUIRES NO RIPARIAN RIGHTS AGAINST OwNE, OF DOFMi MAINTEDm FOR
PRESCRInIVE PERID.-Fifty years before the plaintiff's action, the defend-
ant's predecessors in title had owned land on a stream across which they
built a dam, creating an artificial pond. The plaintiff acquired land
bordering on the pond and floated logs thereon to his sawmill. The defend-
ant changed the user of the water from the pond, which resulted in lowering
its water level so rapidly that the plaintiff could not float logs to his mill.
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He sought to enjoin the defendant. Held, that the plaintiff acquired no
riparian rights on an artificial watercourse against the owner of a dam
which had been maintained for the prescriptive period. Caflisch v. Clymer
Power Corporation (1925, Sup. Ct. Chautauqua Co.) 125 ,Misc. 243, 211
N. Y. Supp. 338.
The growing tendency in this country is to grant to the owner of land on
an artificial waterway riparian rights arising "by prescription", where the
plaintiff's equities are strong. Various theories have been invented on
which to allow him to recover, although the court in the instant case does
not appear to have considered them. Thus by the doctrine of "reciprocal
easements" the owner of the servient tenement is said to acquire his rights
at the same time 'that the dominant owner gains his. Delaney v. Boston
(1839, Del.) 2 Harr. 489; Mathewson v. Hoffman (1889) 77 Mich. 420, 43
N. W. 879; Kray v. Muggli (1901) 84 Minn. 90, 86 N. W. 882. This theory
can hardly be sustained, for at no point during the prescriptive period does
a right of action arise in favor of the dominant tenant. Mason v. Shrews-
bury (1871) L. R. 6 Q. B. 578; 3 Farnham, Waters and Water Rights
(1904) 2398. Again, a fiction has been resorted to by holding that artificial
waterways become natural by continuing for the prescriptive period. Mine-
hant v. Murphy (1912) 149 Wis. 14, 134 N. W. 1130; Smith v. Youmans
(1897) 96 ,Wis. 103, 70 N. W. 1115. Likewise, where they are continued
over so long a period of time that nature itself becomes adapted to the
artificial conditions. Kray v. Muggli, supra (where a natural forest had
sprung up around artificial lakes). In many cases the courts tend to com-
bine these two theories with the so-called doctrine of equitable estoppel,
based on the idea of unfairness to the servient tenant. Shepardson V.
Perkins (1878) 58 N. H. 354; Ford v. Whitlock (1855) 27 Vt. 265. Normally
it is said that, to constitute an equitable estoppel, there must be a false
representation or concealment of material fact by the person estopped
[Pittsburg v. Danforth (1875) 56 N. H. 272 (tax list and warrant)]
made wilfully [Pickard v. Sears (1837, K. B.) 6 Ad. & El. 469 (sale
of machinery)] or innocently [Tomkinson v. Balkis Consolidated Co. (1891)
2 Q. B. 614 (involving a share certificate)] and with the intent that the
other party shall act upon it. Mayenborg v. Haynes (1872) 50 N. Y. 675
(involving promissory note). The time element does not seem important.
In the artificial riparian cases, however, the running of at least the pre-
scriptive period against the dominant owner appears essential to give rise
to the rights of the servient owner. If a generalization may be drawn from
these cases, it would seem that the servient tenant has been protected upon
showing (1) that the prescriptive period has run, producing a reasonable
belief in the permanency of the artificial conditions and (2) that serious
injury would result from interference. It seems advisable to abandon the
fictions and to allow recovery in cases which, like the instant one, are within
the test suggested.
